Security architecture
Trust chain, threat model and security requirements defined before implementation.
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Security added after a device ships rarely covers the whole system. We design the trust chain early — secure boot, signed updates, key handling, encrypted storage and secure onboarding — so a compromised network or a physical attacker does not become a compromised device.
A device with an unsigned bootloader, a shared factory key and plaintext storage can be permanently compromised by an attacker with physical access, even if every network path is encrypted. Once that happens, no certificate you issue later will restore trust in the device.
We build the trust chain from the root of trust outward: immutable boot, verified images, per-device keys, protected storage and revocable credentials. Each layer assumes the one below it may already be hostile.
Immutable or protected boot stage with a verified chain from the first instruction.
Unique keys per device, so one compromised unit does not compromise the fleet.
Updates verified before they run, with a path to revoke compromised firmware.
Interfaces, services and credentials reviewed and tightened, with the reasoning recorded.
Security work can be a focused review of an existing device or the full design of the trust chain for a new one.
Trust chain, threat model and security requirements defined before implementation.
Discuss thisVerified boot chain, immutable stages, anti-rollback and recovery paths.
Discuss thisSigning infrastructure, key hierarchy, storage, rotation and revocation.
Discuss thisEncrypted flash, key derivation and secret handling for device credentials.
Discuss thisDevice identity, provisioning and certificate issuance designed for your deployment.
Discuss thisServices, interfaces, debug access and credentials reviewed and tightened.
Discuss thisScope is agreed in writing before work starts, so deliverables and responsibilities are clear.
Each layer is designed assuming the layer beneath it may already be compromised, which is the only model that survives a physical attacker.
Assets, entry points and realistic attack paths documented before controls are chosen.
Verified boot chains, immutable stages, anti-rollback and controlled recovery.
Key hierarchy, secure storage, rotation, revocation and per-device identity.
Encrypted flash, authenticated data and safe handling of stored credentials.
Provisioning, identity issuance and enrolment flows designed for your deployment.
Signed updates, version policy, staged rollout and withdrawal of compromised images.
Security elements, OTP, fuses and hardware keys integrated into the board design.
Attack surface reduced, debug paths controlled and findings documented.
Threat model, trust chain, keys and updates, then hardening and documentation.
Assets, attack surfaces and current protections assessed and documented.
Security assessmentRoot of trust, boot verification, keys and identity designed together.
Security architectureBoot, signing, storage protection and onboarding implemented and tested.
Security implementationAttack surface reduced, testing evidence and documentation delivered for audit.
Security reportControls are selected to match the device lifetime and the threat level, not to satisfy a checklist.
Safety, connectivity and lifecycle expectations differ by sector, and they shape the architecture from the start.
Rugged, secure and mission-critical systems with controlled supply and documentation.
DefenceControl panels, motor drives, gateways and automation hardware for continuous operation.
IndustrialDiagnostic and monitoring devices designed with patient safety and compliance in mind.
HealthcareMonitoring, metering, conversion and control electronics for energy and power systems.
Energy & powerIn-cabin electronics, LED drivers and control units designed around automotive electrical and thermal expectations.
AutomotiveOnboard and signalling electronics built for vibration, temperature cycling and long maintenance cycles.
RailwaysThe scenarios below illustrate the kind of work we do — they are not published client case studies or measured results. Ask us about relevant experience for your product.
Challenge: Firmware could be replaced on a device in the field without detection.
Approach: Signed images, verified boot and anti-rollback implemented, with a path to withdraw a bad release.
Explore IoT & sensorsChallenge: Every device used the same key, so extracting one exposed the whole fleet.
Approach: Per-device identity with protected key storage and revocable credentials designed in.
Explore connectivityChallenge: Stored configuration and credentials were readable if the device was opened.
Approach: Encrypted storage, controlled debug access and hardening documented for review.
Explore testing & complianceWhat buyers usually want to know before scoping this kind of work.
Ask about your requirements →Security architecture and threat modelling, secure boot implementation, firmware signing and key management, encrypted storage, secure onboarding, update security, and device hardening reviews.
It depends on how long the device lives, whether it can be reached physically and what a compromised device would cost. We will give you a straight assessment rather than selling features you do not need.
Keys are generated per device, stored in protected hardware where available, and organised in a hierarchy that allows rotation and revocation. Shared factory keys are avoided because they expose the whole fleet.
Yes, provided the update chain supports version policy and revocation. We design that capability in from the start, because retrofitting it to a shipped fleet is extremely difficult.
Yes. We can review an existing product’s boot chain, key handling, update mechanism and attack surface, then prioritise the changes by risk and effort.
We integrate with the certificate or identity system you use and can design the enrolment and rotation flows. The specific provider depends on your deployment and commercial requirements.
Explore the rest of the programme, or get in touch about this service directly.
Tell us what the device does, how long it will be in the field, whether it can be physically accessed and what a compromised device would mean. We will give you a prioritised assessment.
No complete specification needed. A short brief of your product and goals is enough to start.